“Close Combat”
and Learning Infantry Tactics
by
Major
Brendan B. McBreen USMC
I have learned more about
small-unit infantry tactics from the “Close Combat” simulation than I have from
thirteen years of Marine Corps infantry experience.
“Close
Combat” is a computer combat simulation published by Atomic Games. The focus of
the simulation is on infantry combat at the small-unit level. The series
currently consists of five versions: Close Combat I: Omaha Beach, II: A
Bridge Too Far, III: The Russian Front, IV: Battle of the Bulge,
and V: Invasion Normandy.
I
am an infantry major with thirteen years commissioned service, seven years with
5th Marines, two years in schools, and three years as an infantry training
officer with the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. I have deployed overseas with
2nd Battalion, 5th Marines four times. I have commanded two infantry platoons
and one rifle company. I have served as a battalion operations officer and
regimental operations officer. I am a student of tactics. I have taught NCOs
and officers infantry tactics. I have participated and led tactical decision
training.
None
of these activities or learning experiences can match the effective and focused
tactical learning that I have experienced through repetitive fighting of the small
unit scenarios in “Close Combat.”
“Close
Combat” permits a player to fight hundreds of scenarios, make thousands of
tactical decisions, experiment with different tactics, and learn from his
mistakes. I would be a far more qualified platoon commander now than I was
twelve years ago. Through fighting the “Close Combat” simulation, I have
internalized significant platoon-level tactical lessons:
- Long unsupported assaults are deadly. Assault for short
distances, against a lightly armed or well-suppressed position. A single enemy soldier can destroy a
squad across 100 meters of open ground.
- A long covered approach is always better than a
short open route. Be careful of covered approaches that cannot be covered by an
overwatching unit.
- Every unit needs obscuration. Smoke save lives.
Every assault and every withdrawal should use smoke.
- Fire and maneuver is the key tactic. Use the majority of
your force to overwhelmingly suppress the enemy, and a small assault unit
to rapidly close on the objective.
- It's all about suppression. Fire without maneuver is wasteful and
indecisive. Effective
suppression is the basis for all infantry tactics.
- Units without mutual support are doomed. Mutually supported
units protect each other from being fixed or assaulted.
- Mortars are inherently inaccurate. Area suppression is NOT destruction.
Rounds are limited, use them well. Don’t waste mortars on bunkers or
buildings.
- Concentrate your fire. Fire control insures
decisive action. In contact, men will disperse their fire. Sequentially
destroying targets with point fire is more effective than distributing
ineffective fires.
- Every unit— squad, platoon, and company—needs antitank capability when facing
tanks.
An infantry unit with no organic antitank weapon is either retreating or overrun. Infantry can only fight tanks in close terrain.
- For anti-tank positions, deep and narrow sectors of fire with
defilade on both sides are best. The best sector of
fire allows you to engage only one tank at a time.
- Defensive positions are temporary. All units need multiple positions and
the ability to withdraw.
- For machinegun positions, deep and
narrow sectors of fire, with defilade on both sides, are best. Primary
and secondary sectors separated by frontal protection are better.
- Cover is life. Move from one covered position to another. Good cover is relative
to a single enemy position. Mutually supporting enemy positions can
overcome the protection of your cover.
- Use bounding overwatch to move. A squad in contact needs immediate
suppression from another unit. The measure of success is the number of
units that can immediately bring suppression to bear upon enemy contact.
Good
Marine leaders know all of these lessons. They have been taught, they have
read, they have trained to do them. But I, and those Marines who have fought
“Close Combat,” know these lessons in our bones. We know the penalty for
mistakes, for mis-reading the situation, for making decisions too late.
Hundreds of simulated men have died in botched assaults, poorly laid positions,
and as a result of unexpected enemy actions in order to teach these lessons. We
have examined the ground, checked the line-of-sight, positioned the units, and
supervised the units in contact so many times that the key tactical principles
have become ingrained as second nature
-
- Repetition. In order to
understand and identify patterns, Marines need hundreds of simulated
examples. In order to internalize lessons, Marines need to fight an active
enemy and suffer from their own tactical mistakes. Through repetition, the
basic lessons become so well known that advanced tactics and experimentation
can be attempted. Only with the experience of fighting through a hundred
enemy positions can a leader look for weaknesses in a given position and
initiate creative ways to exploit that weakness. Reading the subtle
aspects of a tactical situation is a learned skill that requires far more
practice than is currently available outside of a simulation.
- Efficient use of time. Schools and units
schedule training time. Far more time is typically available to
individuals in the ‘gaps.’ Weekends, nights, travel time, and dead time
can all be used for individual simulation training. This time is usually
far more plentiful than that allocated to formal learning environments. In
the operating forces, especially, opportunities for individualized
learning should be maximiznd actual field
exercises, are important and must be done by all leaders. Schools and units
must focus on real leaders, real units, and real ground.
To augment this practical training however, leaders need to experience the
chaotic challenges l1 level1 lfo1;tab-stops:list .5in'>Peer competition. Marines can fight
each other on a simulated battlefield. These tactical learning
experiences, heightened by professional rivalry, can serve as a catalyst
for doctrinal discussions, an opportunity to build leader cohesion, and a
chance to compare tactics and techniques among professionals. “Close
Combat” simulation is a great tool while deployed either on ship, on
exercise, or overseas.l field
exercises, are important and must be done by all leaders. Schools and units
must focus on real leaders, real units, and real ground.
To augment this pracp class=MsoNormal>The
Marine Corps Training and Education Command at Quantico is currently evaluating
a Marine version of “Close Combat” for training use. “Close Combat” is a valuable teaching tool. I recommend it to all
Marine leaders interested in improving their small-unit tactical skills. Fight
the scenarios. Fight your peers. Fight to learn to lead.
To augment this pracp class=MsoNormal>
To augment this pracp class=MsoNormal>Major
McBreen is currently a student at the School of Advanced Warfighting.
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